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Abstract  The dynamics of fish stocks are an important consideration in deter-
mining appropriate fishery management policy. Equally crucial are the
dynamics of fishing effort. Both these dynamics have been incorporated in a
simulation model to analyze the bio-socioeconomic impacts of four alternative
limited entry management policies for the multispecies, multigear small pelagic
fishery of northwest Peninsular Malaysia. Fishing effort dynamics are deter-
mined by the difference in profits and opportunity costs. Several management
alternatives are evaluated at equilibrium. Performance variables such as equi-
librium catch, social profits, consumer surplus, social benefits, direct fishery
employment and income of individual crew are used in the evaluation. The im-
plications for policy makers are discussed.
Key words  Fishing effort dynamics, license fee, limited entry licensing, oppor-
tunity cost of effort, simulations.
Introduction
Fishery systems have very complex interactions between resource stocks and the
factors such as labor and capital used to harvest the stocks. Sound management of
these systems should take into account all the biological, economic and social fac-
tors (Fletcher et al. 1988; Anderson 1985; Wilson 1982; Beddington and May 1980).
While the population dynamics of fish stocks has been given much attention in the
past, other factors such as the adjustment dynamics of fishing effort have been given
less consideration in the fishery management literature (Charles 1989).
Undoubtedly, fishery regulations will affect the fish stocks being managed. On
the other hand, fishermen in the real world will also respond accordingly to the
types of regulation being imposed. Understanding the adjustment processes of fish-
ing effort is crucial for designing and implementing efficient and equitable fishery
management policies (Terkla et al. 1985). Doeringer et al. (1986) argue that the be-
havioral responses of fishermen in supplying effort need to be taken into account in
fishery management, in particular with regard to effort controls.
When systems are dynamic, the appropriate tools for analyzing optimal manage-
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ment strategy include optimal control and dynamic programming (Clark 1990;
Cohen 1987; Anderson and Ben-Israel 1981; Hilborn 1979; Holling 1978). However,
due to the complexity inherent in tropical fisheries systems, these techniques suffer
from the problems of intractability and “curse of dimensionality” (Schriber 1991;
Clark 1990; Fair 1974). Consequently, they have limited practicability and are suited
only for the discovery of general principles (Arnason 1990).
One other technique to be used to study complex fishery systems is simulation.
This technique does not suffer from the above problems (Schriber 1991) but it may
not yield theoretically optimal results. Moreover, system simulation models can be
used to understand the effect of different management policies on the fishery system
components (Arnason 1990; Richardson and Gates 1986; Grant et al. 1981). The
purpose of this paper is to describe a simulation model which incorporates both fish
population dynamics and the dynamics of fishing effort. The model is used to exam-
ine the bio-socioeconomic effects of alternative management policies for the small
pelagic fishery of northwest Peninsular Malaysia.
The small pelagic fishes are among the most important species groups harvested
in northwest Peninsular Malaysia, contributing annually from 1980 to 1989 about
37% of the total fish catch and over 90% of total pelagic landings (Department of
Fisheries Malaysia 1981–90). In terms of value, small pelagic fishes contributed
about 17% and 68% of the wholesale value of total fish and total pelagics in 1989.
The four most important small pelagic species groups, namely, Indian mackerel,
scads, sardine, and tuna are incorporated in the model. These fish accounted for ap-
proximately 52% of total fish landings in northwest Peninsular Malaysia between
1980 and 1989. Small pelagic species in the region are predominantly caught by
three types of gear: purse seine, trawl, and drift net. The combined landings of these
gears made up at least 80% of the total catch for each small pelagic species group.
These dominant gear types are also explicitly included in the model.
The model involves numerous assumptions. The next section describes various
components of the model. This is followed by a description of the simulations for
four alternative management policies. The results of the simulations are presented in
the following section, and a discussion of fishery policy implications is given in the
final section.
The Model
The broad structure of the model has three components: (1) the biological, (2) the
socioeconomic, and (3) the management. The biological submodel describes the
population dynamics of the small pelagic fishery. In the socioeconomic component,
the benefits and costs of fishing operations are presented. The dynamics of fishing
effort are described in the management component section.
Biological Submodel
The population dynamics of each small pelagic fish stock is represented by surplus
production models because data on the population parameters for these species in
Malaysia are either sparse or mostly unavailable (Chullasorn and Purwito 1986).
The rate of change of fish stock  ˙ Xi is determined by natural reproductive dynamics
and harvesting
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where F(Xi) is the natural growth rate of fish stock i which is dependent on the cur-
rent size of the population Xi = Xi(t). The quantity harvested per unit of time is rep-
resented by Hi = Hi(t). The net growth rate  ˙ Xi is obtained by subtracting the rate of
harvest Hi from the rate of natural growth F(Xi).
Functional relationships commonly used to represent the natural growth rate of
fish stock are either the logistic (Schaefer 1957; Schnute 1977) or the Gompertz
(Fox 1970). These specifications are as follows:
Logistic: F(Xi) = riXi[1 – (Xi/Ki)] (2)
Gompertz: F(Xi) = siXi  ln (Ki/Xi) (3)
where ri is the intrinsic growth rate, Ki is the environmental carrying capacity, and si
is the constant associated with the intrinsic growth rate for species i.
The rate of harvest of species i (Hi) is assumed proportional to aggregate stan-
dardized fishing effort (E) and the biomass of the stock (Xi); that is
Hi = qiXiE (4)
where qi is the catchability coefficient.
The standardized fishing effort, measured in number of fishing days needs fur-
ther deliberations. In a multigear fishery, there is heterogeneity in the types of gear
used, vessel sizes, engine power, ancillary and fish-finding equipment. Combina-
tions of these inputs have different effects on the fish stocks. Thus standardization
of fishing effort is required which involves first estimating the relative fishing
power for the vessels and gears as follows (Gulland 1983)
Pcj = Ucj/Us (5)
where Pcj is the estimated fishing power of vessels using gear j in tonnage class c;
Ucj is the average catch per unit of effort for vessels using gear j in tonnage class c;
and Us is the average catch per unit of effort for vessels of a particular gear in a par-
ticular tonnage class which is used as the standard. The average catch per unit of ef-
fort for drift net vessels is used as the standard in computing the relative fishing
power of other gears. This is because the number of drift nets in use is the largest
among the gear types and data on fishing days of the drift net fleet are not catego-
rized by tonnage classes. The fishing power of a particular gear type (Pj) is then the
weighted average fishing power among its various tonnage classes. The weights
used are the ratio of the number of vessels in a particular tonnage class to the total
number of vessels for the gear. The estimates of the average fishing power for vari-
ous gear types are shown in table 1. Once average fishing power has been calcu-
lated, the standardized fishing effort exerted by gear j is computed as
Ejt = PjTjtVjt (6)
where Ejt is the standardized fishing effort of gear j at time t; Pj represents average
relative fishing power of gear type j; Tjt is the average fishing days of vessels j at
time t; and Vjt denotes the number of vessels j at time t.
If stock i is in steady state equilibrium, then  ˙ Xi = 0. The biological parameters
of stock i can be estimated by substituting specific form of F(Xi) and Hi into equa-
tion (1). With logistic form for F(Xi), Schaefer (1957) shows that the yield-effort
function becomesTai and Heaps 88
Hit = qiKiEt – (qi
2 Ki/ri) Et
2        if Et ≤  ri/qi (7)
With the Gompertz form for F(Xi), the yield-effort model as shown by Fox (1970) is
thus
Hit = qiKiEt exp[–(qi/si)Et] (8)
Without making the assumption of steady state equilibrium, Schnute (1977) trans-
formed the Schaefer model and estimated the parameters with the following dy-
namic equation
ln[Uit/Uit ,– 1] = ri – qi[(Et + Et–1)/2] – [ri/(qiKi)][(Uit + Uit ,– 1)/2] (9)
Table 1
Description and Values of Biological and Technical Parameters
Parameter Definition Value
ri Intrinsic growth rate per year for
Indian mackerel 2.308
Tuna 0.194
si Constant associated with intrinsic growth rate per year for
Scads 0.027
Sardine 0.044














θ ij Proportion of catch of species i by gear j
Indian mackerel - trawl 0.271
Purse seine 0.591
Drift net 0.138
Scads  - trawl 0.185
Purse seine 0.794
Drift net 0.021
Sardine - trawl 0.214
Purse seine 0.755
Drift net 0.031
Tuna   - trawl 0.001
Purse seine 0.814
Drift net 0.185
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where Uit =  () ,– UU it i t 1  is the average catch per unit of fishing effort for species i at
time t.
Tai (1992) has found that the Schaefer and Schnute model provides the best fit
for the tuna and Indian mackerel species, respectively, while the Fox model fits well
for the scads and sardine species. Based on these relationships, the biological pa-
rameter values which represent the ‘average’ conditions for 1968 to 1990 were esti-
mated and are presented in table 1.
In the simulations, equations (7) or (8) are used to calculate Hit, the harvest of i
at time t, which is then allocated among the three gear types. The allocation is done
by assuming that the ratio of the catch of species i by gear j to the aggregate catch of
species i is a constant proportion (θ ij),1 i.e.,
Hijt = θ ijHjt (10)
with θ ij =  Hij/ Hi , where  Hij and  Hi  are respectively the time-averaged harvest of
species i by gear j and the time-averaged total harvest of species i. The values of θ ij
are presented in table 1.
Socioeconomic Submodel
This submodel describes the computations of variables which will be used to evalu-
ate the performance of several management policies to be discussed in a later section.
The performance variables include equilibrium harvest, social profits, consumer sur-
plus, social benefits, individual crew income and direct fishery employment.
Social Benefit
The social benefit derived from a fishery is the sum of consumer surplus, resource
rent and producer surplus. The producer surplus comprises the intramarginal rent of
highliner vessels (Copes 1972). However, it is difficult to separate the resource rent
and producer surplus in this study due to the aggregated nature of the data. Hence,
resource rent and producer surplus are aggregated into the social profit from exploit-
ing the fishery. This social profit corresponds to revenues over and above payments nec-
essary to keep the factors of production in their present use (assuming capital and labor
are paid at their opportunity costs). The social profit function (π t) is as follows:
π t = Σ j[Σ i(PitHijt) + BCjt – (cj + γ j)Ejt – Yjt – FCjt]( 1 1 )
where Pit represents ex-vessel price of species i, BCjt denotes revenue from by-catch
for gear j; cj and γ j represents trip expense and opportunity cost per unit of standard-
ized effort for gear j respectively;2 Yjt denotes crew expense for gear j at time t; and
FCjt is the fixed cost for gear j.
Fish prices are considered as fixed and exogenous when they are determined in-
ternationally or when landings represent a very small proportion of the overall mar-
ket. The prices of sardine and tuna are determined in this way. On the other hand,
1 Ideally, harvest of species i by gear j at time t, Hijt ought to be estimated from data on effort directed
by gear j to species i. However, these data are unavailable and hence this assumption is made to ap-
proximate Hijt from Hit.
2 One unit of standardized effort is equivalent to one thousand standardized fishing days.Tai and Heaps 90
the prices for Indian mackerel and scads are variable in response to the conditions of
supply and demand in the domestic market. Following DeVoretz (1982), the price
equations for Indian mackerel and scads are specified in log-linear form as follows:
ln Pit = α 0i + α 1i ln Qit + Σ uα ui ln Put + α 4i ln It (12)
where Pit = ex-vessel price of species i at time t; Qit = total quantity supplied of spe-
cies i at time t; Put = prices of small pelagic species other than i at time t and It = per
capita income at time t. The coefficients for the price equations for Indian mackerel and
scads have been estimated and discussed in Tai (1992) and are shown in table 2.3
Revenue from by-catch is computed by multiplying the total catch of species
other than the small pelagic and their corresponding average price. It is assumed that
revenue from by-catch is proportional to the weight of small pelagic catches which
implies that the mix of small pelagic species and by-catches in the harvest remains
unchanged over time. This assumption is made because it is not possible to model
explicitly the catches and revenues from fish other than the small pelagics as there
are more than fifty species or species groups harvested by the gears. The factor of
proportionality for each gear type (BCj) as shown in table 2 is derived by computing
the average of the ratio of by-catch revenue to the small pelagic catches of each gear
type from 1980 to 1989.
Fishing costs comprise fixed, variable, and opportunity costs. Fixed cost (FCjt)
consists of depreciation of fishing assets, and is incurred irrespective of whether a
fishing unit is operative.
FCjt = FjVjt (13)
where Fj is constant fixed cost per vessel obtained from Md. Ferdous (1990) as
shown in table 2 and Vjt denotes the number of vessels of gear type j. Variable costs
consist of trip expense and crew cost. Trip expense includes the costs of fuel, oil,
ice, food, nets, and expenses for fish aggregating devices such as floating lamps.
Trip expense per unit of standardized effort for each gear type (cj) is shown in table
2.4 Crew cost is computed as in (14) based on share system which is the dominant
system of crew remuneration.
Yjt = [Σ i(PitHijt) + BCjt – cjEjt]Shj (14)
where Shj denotes crew share of the net proceeds from sale of fish for gear type j as
shown in table 2 obtained from Md. Ferdous (1990). The opportunity cost of effort
for gear j (γ j) represents the benefits foregone by keeping input factors to produce a
unit of fishing effort in their present use. In practice, it is very difficult to measure
the opportunity cost of fishing effort. The opportunity cost can be estimated from an
3 The data for estimating the price equations were from the following sources: the ex-vessel prices were
adapted from the Malaysian Fisheries Development Authority reports, quantity supplied data were from
the Annual Fisheries Statistics, and the per capita income data were obtained from the Economic Re-
ports. These equations were estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique to account
for possible presence of contemporaneous correlations between the error terms of the equations.
4 Average trip expense per standardized fishing day for gear type j (cj) is computed as follows. (1) Cal-
culate the trip expense per standardized fishing day in year t by multiplying the annual trip expenses per
vessel obtained from Md. Ferdous (1990) by the number of vessels, then adjusting by the consumer
price index in year t (1980 = 100) and dividing by the total standardized effort in year t. (2) Compute
the average trip expense per day fished for the years between 1980 and 1990.Effort Dynamics and Fisheries Management Policies 91
Table 2
Description and Values of Economic Parameters
Parameter Description Value




























α 0i Intercept of price equation for
Indian mackerel –6.337
Scads 2.169
α 1i Coefficient of quantity supplied in price equation for
Indian mackerel –0.123
Scads –0.082
α 2i Coefficient of ex-vessel price of
Scads in Indian mackerel price equation 0.511
Indian mackerel in scads price equation 0.487
α 3i Coefficient of ex-vessel price of sardine in price equation for
Indian mackerel 0.124
Scads 0.308
α 4i Coefficient for per capita income in price equation for
Indian mackerel 1.246
Scads 1.259
Source: Tai 1992.Tai and Heaps 92
equation describing the dynamics of effort as suggested by Wilen (1976). This will
be discussed in more detail in the management submodel.
Consumer surplus is derived from consumption of Indian mackerel and scads
since these species have downward sloping demand curves. The demands for sardine
and tuna are perfectly elastic as their prices are determined exogenously. The change
in Marshallian consumer surplus (Cst)5 is estimated by first transforming the price
equation (12) into a quantity-dependent demand equation and then integrating the
area under the demand function between the prices as follows:
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Here P10 and P11 are the prices of Indian mackerel in period 0 and 1 respectively, P20
and P21 are the prices of scads in period 0 and 1 respectively, I denotes per capita
consumer income and the β ’s are the coefficients of the quantity dependent demand
equations for Indian mackerel and scads.
Direct Employment and Individual Crew Income
Direct fishery employment (DEt) is computed as follows:
DEt = Σ j(CrjVjt) (16)
where Crj denotes average number of crews per vessel j obtained from Md. Ferdous
(1990) as shown in table 2 and Vjt is the number of vessels j in operation.
Individual crew income for gear j(CYjt) is estimated by dividing total crew ex-
penses (Yjt) by direct employment for gear j
CYjt = (Yjt/DEjt) (17)
Management Submodel
This submodel describes the dynamics of fishing effort which are likely be affected
by fisheries management policies and regulations, in particular with regards to effort
control policies.
The original impetus for incorporating fishing effort dynamics into the “traditional”
fishery systems came from Smith (1968). In his model, Smith postulated that fishing ef-
fort changed over time in response to the availability of profits in the fishery. Recently,
several researchers have examined factors in addition to profit which determine the dy-
namics of fishing effort. For example, Wilen (1976) incorporated a “cutoff” rate of re-
turn to entrepreneurs; Opaluch and Bockstael (1984) considered some threshold of po-
tential returns in alternative employment (or opportunity cost); and Krauthamer et al.
(1987) examined several social, cultural, and psychological factors.
5 When there are simultaneous price changes, the Marshallian consumer surplus suffers from the path-
dependency problem (Johansson 1991). However, if a path is consistently followed such as allowing
first the price of Indian mackerel to change, followed by the change in price of scads, the path-depen-
dency problem may not be serious when comparing alternative fisheries management policies.Effort Dynamics and Fisheries Management Policies 93
The dynamics of fishing effort for gear type j is postulated to follow a differen-
tial equation:6
˙ Ejt  = Ω j[(π jt/Ejt) – γ j] (18)
where  ˙ Ejt denotes time rate of change of effort for gear j at time t; π jt = [Σ i(PitHijt) +
BCjt – cjEjt – Yjt – FCjt]; γ j is the opportunity cost of a unit of standardized effort for
gear j; and Ω j is a “response parameter” indicating how fast effort of gear j responds
to excess profits. Equation (18) shows that whenever π jt per unit of standardized ef-
fort for gear j is greater than γ j, effort entry will occur. On the other hand, effort will
exit the fishery when π jt per unit of standardized effort is less than γ j. In an equilib-
rium fishery,  ˙ Ejt = 0 as there is no entry or exit of fishing effort of gear j. This hap-
pens only if π jt per unit of standardized effort equals γ j.7
The Ω j and γ j are estimated directly from equation (18) using seemingly unre-
lated regression to take into account the contemporaneous correlations between the
error terms (Kennedy 1985) and the results are shown in table 3. Except for the Ωγ
of the drift net fleet, the parameter estimates for all gear types are significant and
are correctly signed. The R2 ranged from 0.21 for trawl to 0.35 for purse seine and
are reasonable since the social and cultural variables which are important determi-
nants of effort dynamics could not be included in the equations due to lack of data.
The estimated coefficients Ω j show that for every Ringgit Malaysia (RM)8 in-
crease in profit per thousand standardized fishing days, fishing effort for trawl,
purse seine and drift net fleet will increase by 0.0627, 0.0365, and 0.0043 thousand
6 This formulation of effort dynamics follows that of Wilen (1976). Some authors (e.g. Allen and
McGlade 1986; Clark 1985) have postulated that effort entry or exit is proportional to aggregate profit
rather than per unit effort profit. This may be unrealistic because it implies that effort entry or exit
would be the same for two fisheries having the same aggregate profit, but one with a higher effort level
and lower profit per unit of effort compared to the other.
7 The effort dynamics equation shows a symmetrical entry and exit response for fishing effort. However,
fisheries management policies to be considered in this paper will always result in π j being greater than
γ j, hence entry of effort will occur. Thus the effort dynamic equation can be treated as effort entry rather
than exit equation.
8 Ringgit Malaysia (RM) is the currency unit of Malaysia.
Table 3
Seemingly Unrelated Regression for Dynamics of Effort by Gear Type
Gear Type
Trawl Purse Seine Drift Net
Ω 0.0627** 0.0365*** 0.0043***
(2.88) (3.77) (3.84)
Ωγ –568.57* –395.06*** –32.16
(–1.67) (–4.95) (–1.39)
R2 0.21 0.35 0.31
γ 9,068 10,823 7,479
Source: Tai 1992.
Figures in parentheses denote t-ratios.
*** = significant at the 1% level.
** = significant at the 5% level.
* = significant at the 10% level.Tai and Heaps 94
standard days respectively. The opportunity cost per thousand standardized days (γ j)
for purse seine is the highest.
Policy Simulations
The above model is used to simulate the relative bio-socioeconomic impacts of ef-
fort control policies for the small pelagic fishery of northwest Peninsular Malaysia.
The description and values for the biological and economic parameters are shown in
tables 1 and 2 respectively. Standardized effort by gear type is the control variable
in the simulations and the initial values for trawl, purse seine and drift net fleets are
set at 10.18, 2.65, and 1.217 million days respectively as shown in table 2. These
initial values are supplied to the model to compute the values of the performance
variables for the first period. The values of standardized fishing effort are then re-
vised in the next period based on the predicted effort changes for the first period and
all values of the performance variables are recalculated. These calculations are reit-
erated until the last period (which corresponds to the equilibrium values of the per-
formance variables) is reached.
Four alternative effort control policies as shown in table 4 are evaluated using
the model. Policy 1 involves maintaining current fishery management policy and
perpetuating the present situation in the fishery. Current fishery management policy
in Peninsular Malaysia involves limiting the number of vessels through the issuing
of licenses (Jahara 1988; Sulaiman and Ch’ng 1987). If the number of licenses is-
sued corresponds to the level of effort commensurate with the objectives of manage-
ment, then policy 1 is desirable and no further action needs to be taken. With policy
1, the dynamics of effort is described by equation (18).
On the other hand, it may still be possible to improve the bio-socioeconomic
performance of the fishery by further restricting the number of vessels to reduce
fishing effort. In order to determine the greatest possible bio-socioeconomic im-
provements, the number of vessels is further restricted as described by Policies 2A
through 2D. Policy 2A involves reducing effort by 40% from policy 1 level while
effort levels for policies 2B, 2C, and 2D represents reduction of 50%, 60%, and 70%
respectively from policy 1 level.9 The dynamics of effort under policies 2A, 2B, 2C,
and 2D can still be described by equation (18). Note that policies 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, and
2D essentially restrict the number of vessels. Fishing effort can still be increased by
raising the number of days each vessel fishes up to some maximum. Denoting the
maximum number of days a vessel of type j can fish per year by Mdj, the maximum
standardized effort per year for each gear type (MEjt) can be calculated as
MEjt = PjVjtMdj (19)
where Pj is the average fishing power, Vjt is the number of vessels at time t, Mdj is
the maximum number of fishing days per vessel and subscript j is for gear type. The
value of Mdj is assumed to be 300, 280, and 280 days for each trawl, purse seine,
and drift net vessel respectively.10
Fishery management policy which merely restricts the number of vessels will
9 Simulations are conducted for policy scenarios where the number of vessels is reduced in steps of 10%
from policy 1 level. Since the greatest bio-socioeconomic improvements lies within the scenarios as de-
scribed by Policies 2A through 2D, only the results of these policy scenarios will be presented and dis-
cussed in this paper.
10 Some days will be lost in a year due to repair and maintenance of vessels and gears, bad weather and rest
for fishing crews. Obviously, vessels do not have to operate up to the maximum days per year. However, the
possibility of earning rents will likely to induce vessels to operate at the maximum number of days.Effort Dynamics and Fisheries Management Policies 95
not be effective. A limited entry licensing policy that successfully restricts fishing
effort initially to some desire level will generate economic rent. The rent will induce
remaining fishermen to increase their effort either through “capital stuffing” their
vessels or by increasing their fishing times, thereby defeating the initial intent of the
policy. The incentive to expand effort needs to be curtailed by imposing fees to appro-
priate all the rent generated in the fishery after fishing effort is reduced to the desired
level. Hence policy 3 describes a scenario where the fishing effort is restricted to the de-
sired level coupled with levying of a license fee to completely appropriate the rent in
the fishery.11 The desired level of effort corresponds to the greatest bio-socioeco-
nomic improvements as determined in the simulations of the various scenarios for
policy 2. With this policy, the equation for fishing effort dynamics becomes:
11 Note that technological progress will increase fishing power of vessels and thus will increase fishing
effort over and above the desired level. In this case, the number of vessels needs to be restricted further
in order to maintain effort at the desired level.
Table 4
Description of Alternative Policies and the Corresponding
Initial Values of Effort in Simulations
Initial Value of
Policy Description Effort (1,000 Days)
1 Present management policy by restricting number of




















3 Restricting effort to policy 2C level and imposing license




4 Restricting effort to policy 2C level, increasing opportunity
   cost of effort by 50% and imposing license fee to appropriate
   completely the rents generated
Trawl 4,072
Purse seine 1,060
Drift net 487Tai and Heaps 96
˙ Ejt  = Ω j[(π jt/Ejt) – γ j – φ j] (20)
where φ j denotes the license fee per unit of effort for gear j. When the fishery is
managed so that the desired level of effort is attained and then a license fee is levied
to appropriate completely the rent generated in the fishery,  ˙ Ejt will be zero. This
then will allow the full license fee to be calculated from equation (20).
Increased opportunity cost of fishermen’s effort is a possible fishery manage-
ment policy which supplements limited entry licensing with full fees (policy 4).
Panayotou (1980) and Smith (1981) argued that a possible solution to fishery prob-
lems in developing countries lies outside the fishery sector. This is because incomes
from fishery for these countries are low and maintaining a high level of employment
is a principal development goal. One way of reducing fishing effort is by creating
more employment outside the fishing sector and transferring surplus fishing inputs
into the nonfishing sectors. As more jobs are available and demand for inputs in the
nonfishing sectors increases, the opportunity costs of effort would be increased.
Moreover, fishermen can be retrained to acquire skill for engaging in more produc-
tive jobs. This will also increase the opportunity cost of effort. The equation for ef-
fort dynamics for policy 4 is as follows:
˙ Ejt  = Ω j[(π jt/Ejt) – (1 + σ )γ j – φ j] (21)
where σ  denotes percent increase in the opportunity cost per unit of effort. For this
study, it is assumed that σ  takes the value of 0.5,12 a 50% increase in the opportunity
cost per unit of effort in the long run.
Simulation Results
The simulation results for policies 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D are presented in figures 1a
through 1c. In figure 1a, fishing effort for policy 1 is seen to increase greatly in the first
year from the initial conditions. The increase is gradual thereafter until the equilibrium
level of effort at 19.25 million days is reached. However, for policies 2A through 2D,
the strong increase in the first year results in effort reaching immediately the equilib-
rium levels which are constrained by the maximum effort as shown in equation (19).
The biological consequences of alternative policies 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D as
presented in figure 1b show that aggregated catch of the small pelagic species in
northwest Peninsular Malaysia is the lowest for policy 1, but the highest for policy
2C. However, in terms of individual small pelagic species, policy 2A and 2B give
the highest equilibrium catch for tuna and Indian mackerel respectively, while the
equilibrium catches of scads and sardine are the highest for policy 2D (table 5). The
results imply that if management policy is aimed at maximizing aggregate catch of
small pelagic fish then policy 2C should be chosen. With this policy however, the
scads and sardine stocks are biologically overexploited while those for Indian mack-
erel and tuna are biologically underexploited.
The evolution of aggregate social benefits13 for policies 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D
is shown in figure 1c. The equilibrium aggregate social benefits is the highest for
12 Ideally the value of σ  should be determined empirically by ascertaining its trend of increase. How-
ever, the assumption is made here because it is difficult to empirically estimate the opportunity cost of
fishing effort since this requires a lot of time-series data from other sectors in the economy.
13 Aggregate social benefits comprise the sum of total social profits and consumer surplus from the small
pelagic fisheries. The consumer surplus from the by-catch is excluded, however.Effort Dynamics and Fisheries Management Policies 97
Figure 1a.  Evolution of Fishing Effort for Policies 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D
Figure 1b.  Evolution of Aggregate Catch for Policies 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2DTai and Heaps 98
policy 2C (RM574.4 million). Thus, policy 2C is the appropriate management policy
if the aim is to maximize aggregate social benefits.
Income to individual crew members for all gear types increases as fishing effort
is reduced from policy 1 level. As shown in table 6, income to individual crew mem-
bers for all gear types is the highest for policy 2D. On the other hand, direct fishery
employment for all gear types decreases as fishing effort is reduced (table 6).
Hence, the results show that there is a trade-off between income to individual crew
members and direct employment. The proper choice of an appropriate policy based
on these trade-offs is essentially the task of policy makers.
The results imply that present management of the fishery can be improved by
further restricting fishing effort. Based on the biological, social, and economic per-
formance, policy 2C appears desirable and provides improvements in the fishery
compared to policy 1.
The impacts of incorporating the dynamics of fishing effort in the simulation for
policy 2C are discernible in table 7. With effort dynamics, total effort was initially
at about 8.9 million standardized days, but then reached the maximum equilibrium
level of about 10 million standardized days in year 2 while total fishing effort re-
mained at 8.9 million standardized days without effort dynamics. The increased in
effort with consideration of the effort dynamics results in lower aggregate social
benefits as well as reduced social profits and income to crew members for all gear
types (table 7). However, aggregate catch, consumer surplus and direct employment
for all gear types increase in this case. Higher aggregate catch with effort increases
Table 5
Harvest Level (mt) of Small Pelagic Species for Alternative Policies
Policy Indian Mackerel Scads Sardine Tuna
MSY 107,900 31,545 12,172 4,080
1 64,520 14,500 3,975 2,805
2A 106,600 24,280 7,802 4,079
2B 107,900 26,980 9,044 4,075
2C 105,000 29,380 10,270 3,927
2D 98,010 31,110 11,340 3,637
Table 6
Equilibrium Individual Crew Income and Direct Employment for
Policies 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D
Individual Crew Income (RM thousand) Direct Employment (man-year)
Policy Trawl Purse Seine Drift Net Trawl Purse Seine Drift Net
1 14.89 5.31 4.01 12,780 6,134 22,400
2A 52.96 14.53 13.20 7,669 4,133 13,440
(+256) (+174) (+42) (–40) (–33) (–40)
2B 67.12 18.37 16.38 6,390 3,440 11,200
(+351) (+246) (+76) (–50) (–44) (–50)
2C 85.37 23.50 20.36 5,110 2,748 8,960
(+473) (+343) (+118) (–60) (–55) (–60)
2D 111.40 31.06 25.90 3,835 2,056 6,720
(+648) (+485) (+178) (–70) (–66) (–70)
Note : Figures in parentheses represent percentage increase (+) or decrease (–) from policy 1 level.Effort Dynamics and Fisheries Management Policies 99
Figure 1c.  Evolution of Aggregate Social Benefits for Policies 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D
is mainly due to increased catch of Indian mackerel which is the dominant species
harvested in the mixed small pelagic stock. The result is expected since this species
is biologically underexploited at the policy 2C level of effort as discussed earlier.
The higher catch of Indian mackerel also causes the increase in consumer surplus.
The above results show that with considerations of effort dynamics, limited en-
try licensing by itself will not produce the desired outcome in the long run. This is
because positive rents are generated in the rationalized fishery which provide incen-
tives for remaining fishermen to increase their fishing effort. In order to maintain
effort at the desired (policy 2C) level, additional measures are needed to curtail the
incentives to expand effort after the initial reduction of effort to policy 2C level. As
discussed earlier, the additional measures include imposition of full license fee
(policy 3) or a combination of increasing the opportunity cost of fishing effort by
50% and the imposition of full license fee (policy 4).
The equilibrium values of the performance variables for policies 3 and 4, com-
pared to those for policy 1, are shown in table 8. The results show that equilibrium
aggregate effort for policies 3 and 4 remained at 8.9 million standardized days.
However, there exist little differences between the values of the performance vari-
ables for policies 3 and 4, except that aggregate social benefit is higher for policy 4.
In addition, the amount of license fee levied per vessel of all gear types for policy 4
is lower (table 9).14 This is because with a higher allowance for opportunity cost of
14 Annual license fee for each gear type is computed in the model based on the number of standardized
fishing days. However, for practical purpose, it is easier to levy license fee on a per vessel basis. The
license fee per vessel is computed by first converting total fishing days for each gear type into number
of vessels equivalent, and then dividing the total license fees by this figure. With technological progress,
the number of vessels needs to be reduced further in order to maintained effort at the desired level as
explained earlier. This will increase the license fee per vessel which will need to be recalculated.Tai and Heaps 100
fishing effort, the resource rent to be appropriated in the form of license fee will be
lower. With higher opportunity cost and lower license fee imposed, policy 4 appears
to be more socially and politically acceptable as compared to policy 3, although
both policies are biologically and economically desirable.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to incorporate biological and effort dynamics in a simulation
model to evaluate the impacts of four fisheries management policies on the small
pelagic fishery system in northwest Peninsular Malaysia. The analysis is based on
several assumptions regarding biological, social, and economic variables. These
policies are: (1) the present situation in the fishery; (2) further reduction of effort by
limiting the number of vessels through a limited entry licensing system; (3) limited
entry licensing and imposition of license fees; and (4) limited entry licensing, impo-
sition of license fee and increasing the opportunity costs of fishing effort.
The results show explicitly that the fishery system will not achieve any desired
outcome through limited entry licensing policy alone. Under this policy, fishermen
have sufficient incentives to expand their effort through “capital stuffing” their ves-
sels and/or increasing their fishing days, even though the number of vessels has
been restricted. The incentives for expanding effort need to be curtailed.
The key implications for policy makers are first, that present fishery manage-
ment policy falls short of the desired level and further biological, social, and eco-
Table 7
Comparison of Policy 2C Performance With and Without the Dynamics of Fishing Effort
Without With
Effort Dynamics Effort Dynamics
Aggregate effort (thousand days) 8,948 9,830
Catch (mt)




Aggregate  146,800 148,600
Consumer surplus (RM million) 18.46 49.46
Social profit (RM million)
Trawl 430.4 393.0
Purse seine 70.5 50.0
Drift net 89.0 82.0
Total 589.9 525.0
Aggregate social benefits (RM million) 608.4 574.4
Employment (man-year)
Trawl 4,748 5,110
Purse seine 2,284 2,748
Drift net 5,181 8,960
Total 12,210 16,820
Crew income (RM thousand)
Trawl 91.4 85.4
Purse seine 31.2 23.5
Drift net 35.5 20.4Effort Dynamics and Fisheries Management Policies 101
nomic improvements are possible. Second, effort reduction can be more effective if
the opportunity costs of effort can be raised. To achieve this end, policies such as
increased employment opportunities outside the fishing sector and improving the
skills of fishermen through job-training are called for. However, the specific rela-
tionships between these policies and the opportunity costs of effort requires further
research. Finally, license fees need to be imposed to appropriate completely the rent
generated in the rationalized fishery.
The data requirements for systems study of a multispecies, multigear fishery are
great. Suitable time-series data on effort, fish stocks, and economic parameters are
needed to estimate the relationships in the fishery system model. Unfortunately, ef-
Table 8
Comparison of the Equilibrium Values of Fishery Performance
Indicators for Policies 3 and 4 from Policy 1 Level
Policy 1 Policy 3 Policy 4
Aggregate effort (thousand days) 19,250 8,948 (–54) 8,948 (–54%)
Catch (mt)
Indian mackerel 64,520 101,100 (+57) 101,100 (+57)
Scads 14,500 30,580 (+111) 30,580 (+111)
Sardine 3,975 10,970 (+176) 10,970 (+176)
Tuna 2,805 3,762 (+34) 3,762 (+34)
Aggregate 85,810 146,412 (+71)  146,412 (+71)
Consumer surplus (RM million) 18.49 47.43 (+157) 47.42 (+157)
Social profits (RM million)
Trawl 82.31 0 (–100) 0 (–100)
Purse seine 0.04 0 (–100) 0 (–100)
Drift net 24.75 0 (–100) 0 (–100)
Total 107.10 0 (–100) 0 (–100)
Aggregate social benefit (RM million) 125.50 566.40 (+352) 579.30 (+362)
Employment (man–year)
Trawl 12,780 4,704(–63) 4,703(–63)
Purse seine 6,134 2,075 (–66) 2,075 (–66)
Drift net 22,400 5,114 (–77) 5,106 (–77)
Total 41,320 11,890 (–71) 11,880(–71)
Crew income (RM thousand)
Trawl 14.89 91.39 (+514) 91.42 (+514)
Purse seine 5.31 31.23 (+488) 31.24 (+488)
Drift net 4.01 35.44 (+784) 35.50 (+785)
Note: Figures in parentheses represent percentage change from policy 1 values.
Table 9
Full License Fee per Vessel (RM thousand)
by Gear Type for Policies 3 and 4
Vessel Type Policy 3 Policy 4
Trawl 327 312
Purse seine 432 390
Drift net 32 31Tai and Heaps 102
forts to date have not been sufficient in collecting and consolidating existing data in
preparation for such a study. Consequently, many simplifying assumptions have
been made in the analyses in this paper. The assumption of equilibrium yield in the
surplus production models is particularly restrictive. Subject to data availability,
other biological or ecological models could be used to represent the dynamics of the
fish stocks. For the dynamics of effort, it is assumed that the time rate of change in
fishing effort is proportional to the difference between current fishery rents and the
possible profit in alternative economic activities or opportunity costs. Of course,
other assumptions regarding the behavior of fishermen in their supply of fishing ef-
fort are also possible. For example, Charles (1989) suggested that fishermen might
adjust their collective fishing effort in order to fully utilize available labor and capi-
tal inputs, or to maintain either constant fishery rents or fishers incomes. These al-
ternative behavioral relationships can be explored in future research.
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